Europe Needs a Soft-Power Approach
Moscow Times
June 28, 2006
by CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES

In the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe was concerned but not worried about the decline of Russia. The European Union did not at the time regard its great neighbor as a political or economic problem; Russia was retreating from empire, and as it grew weaker it appeared less threatening. Over the past five years, though, the Russian economy has begun to revive and Russia's government has made gains in policy coherence, if not always in directions to Europe's liking. Today, the question is whether Europe has the policy tools to deal with this new phenomenon.

Europe has become the most successful peaceful power in history. It has rendered inconceivable the very idea of war in Western and Central Europe. In the Balkans, its strongest argument is that if the states of that region behave properly toward one another, they too can join the European Union.

Europe cannot, of course, expand indefinitely, and each country must secure its own future. Nonetheless, Europe must recognize that its soft power is substantially reduced when dealing with any country that is barred from membership. It must therefore seek new sources of soft power.

Where might the EU's soft power lie in the case of Russia? Europe should consider three key steps: First, it should develop some middle ground between membership and rejection. Europe and Russia are today poised to pull Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in two different directions. When the Orange Revolution took place in Kiev, major figures in Europe talked publicly about Ukraine now being on "their side." Such an approach to the problems of Ukraine is disastrous. It is impossible to draw a new line between Russia and Ukraine without severe economic consequences for Ukraine, unless of course the European Union is willing to mount a major financial assistance program.

Last winter's gas imbroglio also sheds light on this issue. Whatever the deficiencies of the Russian approach, and there were many, it was and is a delusion for Europeans to believe that any Russian government would subsidize through cheap energy Ukraine's drawing away from Russia to move closer to Europe. If Europe wanted Ukraine on its side, it would have to mount an aid program that would compensate Ukraine for the loss of an energy subsidy worth more than $1 billion per year. By the same token, some U.S. strategists are misguided if they believe that Russia would want to maintain its energy subsidy to Ukraine so as to ease Ukraine's entry to NATO. No government in the world would consent to such an arrangement, so why should we expect Russia to behave any differently?

Finding a place for Russia in a larger European design could do much to alleviate the tension that is building up. One solution might be to design a special trading regime of wide-ranging cooperation with the specific aim of developing more organic ties between Europe and Russia. Could the EU and Russia cooperate on a major development in aircraft design? Could they work together on nuclear energy, now that it seems to be entering a new phase of development? What is needed is not so much a laundry list of objectives but a time-structured negotiation that would make progress possible. If more organic links between Europe and Russia could be encouraged, then, were Ukraine or Belarus to join the European Union in years to come, it would be far less traumatic for Russia than today.

The West, for its part, should begin speaking up in favor of altering NATO practices so that any further expansion of the alliance seems less of a threat to Russia. When the Baltic states joined NATO, U.S. jets were soon flying along the Russian border only a few kilometers from St. Petersburg. There was no security reason at all for this provocative forward movement of American power. Today, 95 percent of the still enormous nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States are dedicated to the destruction of each other. It is as if the Cold War had never ended.

The Europeans should press the United States and Russia to enter into serious discussions about substantial further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, so that they no longer pose a threat either to one another or to Europe. They should press the Americans and the Russians to enter into negotiations that would lead to a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Such a stance would be soft power with an edge. After all, who has a greater stake in the reduction of continental arsenals than Europe?

Second, Europe should want to recognize more openly than in the past its shared interest with the United States in Russia's democratic development. Several years ago, I suggested to the former head of a European aid program that U.S.-European cooperation made sense when giving assistance to Russia, but received the answer that cooperation was impossible since America was the enemy because its real goal in helping Russia was to gain market share there.

That was a remarkably shortsighted view of the stakes involved in Russia's political and economic evolution. Although Europe will of course want to fashion its own assistance programs, internal EU regulations in any case now make it very difficult for Europe to cooperate with fellow democratic countries in supporting civil society in Russia. Yet, in the difficult period through which Russian civil society is passing, a common approach at times involving a measure of co-funding could yield benefits. Together we could show much-needed solidarity with the struggling civil society community in Russia. The aim would be to find a common dialogue to encourage partnerships between civil society in Europe and America on the one hand and in Russia on the other.

Third, Europe should develop a more audible policy voice on Russian issues. Many individual EU countries have special interests peculiar to their own circumstances that cause them to hesitate to address Russia's larger political issues. Not every European country has the same degree of interest in these issues, and this lack of shared concern enables Russian officials to discount the importance of individual European voices and attribute allegedly anti-Russian feelings to criticisms from individual European states. A serious European policy could effectively short-circuit this tactic.

In developing more tools to deal with an emerging Russia, the stakes for Europe are enormous. What Europe has accomplished over the past 50 years should be the envy of the rest of the world, but much of that progress could be jeopardized if, as the Ukrainian government recently warned with respect to European efforts to disengage from some of its neighbors, we end up creating new devils to the east through policies of isolation or neglect.

Charles William Maynes is president of the Eurasia Foundation. This comment appeared in the magazine Europe's World.

Return to the Current Articles page